INDIVIDUAL REMEMBERING AND ‘COLLECTIVE MEMORY’: THEORETICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES

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ABSTRACT

Over the past decade cultural historians have focussed upon ‘collective memory’, drawing upon the original theories of sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. The conceptualisation of memory in this body of work either conflates collective and individual memory, or relegates the latter to a position of insignificance. Meanwhile oral historians are increasingly focusing upon the ways in which individual recollections fit (often unconscious) cultural scripts or mental templates. As a consequence, the interpretative theories of oral history and collective memory studies are converging. The paper argues that if oral historians reject the capacity of individuals to engage critically and constructively with inherited ideas and beliefs, the field has made a paradigmatic shift from the concerns and values that led to its growth and development in the 1960s.

KEY WORDS: collective memory; individual memory; cultural scripts; psychoanalytic templates

If one had to pick a key moment for oral history, it would surely be the late 1970s. Following seminal publications by Ronald Grele, Luisa Passerini and Alessandro Portelli, among others, historians, as Michael Roper put it, made an epistemological shift into the ‘interpretive mode’. Responding in part to criticism from their empiricist colleagues, many historians turned their attention to the narrative forms and creative dimensions of oral narratives. In the British context the Popular Memory Group at the Centre for Contemporary Studies in Birmingham reoriented oral historians towards the social and cultural contexts shaping memories of the past. In retrospect, this shift in direction paralleled broader intellectual developments, often subsumed under the expression ‘the linguistic turn’. This approach emphasizes the fundamental constitutive role of language and cultural discourses in shaping individual interpretations of experience.

Within oral history, and the field of life narratives in general, the focus moved away from the individual and towards the wider social and cultural context within which remembering takes place. This approach is encapsulated in the following excerpts from two historians working in the field of life narrative. In the first, noted autobiographer Jill Ker Conway lays out her position in a chapter entitled ‘Memory’s Plots’:
autobiography) has resonance for contemporary directions in the analysis of oral histories. In Conway's passage, the key word is the use of 'script'. In the second example, taken from a recent study of war memory and commemoration, edited by T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, the key concept is that of 'templates', associated with the psychoanalytic concept of unconscious mental schemas. Memories of war, the authors argue, are shaped by the 'templates of remembrance... [the] cultural narratives, myths and tropes... through which later conflicts are understood'.

Historians are increasingly focussing upon the ways in which individual recollections fit (often unconscious) cultural scripts or templates. There is apparently little space for the consciously reflective individual, or for the role of experience in changing the ways in which individuals view the world. As a consequence, oral history is converging with collective memory studies, within which individual memory is either subsumed under 'collective memory', or assigned to the realm of the passive unconscious.

**COLLECTIVE MEMORY STUDIES**

Cultural historians and cultural theorists largely agree that contemporary society is in the grip of a memory boom, expressed in myriad ways from the building of memorials and expansion of museums, to retro fashions and popular representations of the past in film and television. These multiple 'sites of memory' (the phrase, of course, is taken from French historian Pierre Nora) have led historians to think about whether another 'venue of memory and identity transmission... operate(s) simultaneously and competitively with history, namely "collective memory"'. While there is no consensus concerning the precise definition of collective memory, in practice collective memory studies appear to fall primarily around two poles.

A large body of cultural history has examined what Paula Hamilton has characterised as a cross-national 'memorial culture... characterised by the dominance of memory and commemoration as the prism through which we negotiate the past'. The focus of these historians is public commemoration and the active participation by large numbers of people 'doing the work of mourning and public remembering themselves...'. The substantial body of work on the memorialisation and remembrance of war comes into this category.

Alternatively, Alon Confino defined collective memory much more broadly, as 'the representation of the past and the making of it into shared cultural knowledge by successive generations in "vehicles of memory", such as books,
films, museums, commemorations, and others.’ In this definition every representation of the past is potentially a form of collective memory.

Despite widespread use of the term ‘collective memory’, it is only fair to point out that many historians are very uneasy about the concept. A number explicitly substitute parallel or alternative terms that better reflect their understanding of the processes through which particular groups, communities or nations collectively remember their past. These terms include, for example, ‘collective remembrance’, ‘collected memories’, ‘cultural memory’, ‘public memory’, or ‘mnemonic communities’. The philosopher of history, Wulf Kansteiner, has written a broad and useful review of collective memory studies that explores a number of the issues that concern historians and cultural theorists, but here I will focus on the problems of most relevance to oral history.

The two definitions of collective memory outlined above contain implications that should concern oral historians. The first is the use of the word ‘memory’ to describe what are really different ways of knowing about the past. As Samuel Hynes pointed out, ‘Memory is the mental faculty by which we preserve or recover our pasts, and also the events recovered. Without that link – now reaching back to then – you have an image of the past in your mind, but it isn’t memory but something else, a social construction, history.’ In other words, all forms of historical understanding – even those that do not engage the faculty of personal memory at all – are increasingly classified as memory. As a consequence, memory has become detached from the individual. This places theorists in a dilemma. Memory is indisputably a faculty of the individual brain, and few would argue that there is any linear or aggregative relationship between individual memory and collective memory. How do cultural theorists resolve this paradox?

A number of cultural theorists subsume individual memory under the rubric of collective memory and reject the significance of individual memory altogether. Sociologist Daniel Schudson argues that since memory can only be expressed through the ‘cultural construction of language in socially structured patterns of recall’, in the most important sense all memory is collective cultural memory. Wulf Kansteiner makes a similar point more cautiously:

Another unsettled area of collective memory studies is the precise relation of the individual and the collective. ... research has time and again emphasized the social nature of individual remembering and forgetting.... The very language and narrative patterns that we use to express memories, even autobiographical memories, are inseparable from the social standards of plausibility and authenticity they embody. In this sense, ‘there is no such thing as individual memory’.

Other historians argue that individual memory is unimportant because it lacks active agency. In Nancy Wood’s study of memory in postwar Europe, individual and collective memories both avail themselves of ‘mechanisms like selection, narrativization, repression, displacement or denial’. However, the ‘emanation of individual memory is primarily subject to the laws of the unconscious...’, whereas collective representations of the past represent the conscious purpose of social groups. In this argument, collective action is permitted a high degree of intentionality, whereas individual memory (despite drawing upon the same cultural mechanisms) lacks a similar sense of purpose. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan also differentiate between the active agency of collective remembrance, and ‘passive memory – understood as the personal recollections of a silent individual’, or ‘humu psychologicus – the man of private memory’. In these definitions, individual memories are confined to the realm of psychology, presumed to lack conscious purpose, and are therefore largely irrelevant for the work of historians.

To sum up, the cultural theorisation of memory/remembering increasingly rejects the value of individual recollection. The first approach declares that the social and cultural context within which remembering takes place determines personal recall to the extent that the individual dimension of memory is deemed insignificant. The second places individual memory within the realm of the unarticulated, or unconscious, psyche. Where do these ideas originate?

Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945)

The concept of collective memory originated with the work of the sociologist, Maurice Halbwachs. Influenced by the sociology of Émile Durkheim in the 1920s, Halbwachs developed a theory of memory that continues to shape contemporary memory studies. As Ian Asman pointed out, Halbwachs’ research shifted our understanding of memory from a "biological framework into a cultural one". More accurately perhaps, Halbwachs shifted memory into the realm of social relationships, as the following summary of his theory illustrates.

First of all, Halbwachs agreed that memory was a mental faculty that could only exist within the individual. In accord with the point made by Samuel Hynes earlier, Halbwachs did not regard
knowledge of events outside direct experience as memory:

I carry a baggage load of historical remembrances that I can increase through conversation and reading. But it remains a borrowed memory, not my own.... For me they are conceptions, symbols. I picture them pretty much as others do. I can imagine them, but I cannot remember them.19

Individuals remember, Halbwachs argued, through dialogue with others within social groups. For example, we remember as children within families, or as adults within religious or occupational groups. Within these groups, Halbwachs suggested, the most durable memories tended to be those held by the greatest number. Finally, while he accepted that not all individu-als within a group would remember the same events or with the same intensity, he suggested that the need for an ‘affective community’ ensured that individuals remembered primarily those memories which were ‘in harmony’ with those of others.20 Therefore the memories of the individual became merged, and submerged, within group, or collective, memory.

Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory is functionalist. Memory functions as a mechanism that unites groups and cements identity. His theory therefore ignores conflicting memories, and tends to suggest that those memories that do not accord with the group gradually fade from memory. Peter Burke made an interesting point in this context, reminding us that the sociology of Emile Durkheim ‘with its emphasis upon community, consensus and cohesion’ developed in the context of European nation-building, and the search for traditions and rituals that could legitimise nation-states. Burke argues that it ‘would be unwise to follow Durkheim and his pupil Halbwachs too closely in this respect, and to discuss the social function of memory as if conflict and dissent did not exist’.21

LIFE NARRATIVE INTERPRETIVE THEORIES

However, contemporary cultural theorists in collective memory have not heeded Burke’s advice, and their work – as we have previously shown – either conflates collective and individual memory or places the latter beyond reach. A little over a decade ago, James Fentress and Chris Wickham pointed out that ‘an important problem facing anyone who wants to follow Halbwachs in this field is how to elaborate a conception of memory which, while doing full justice to the collective side of one’s conscious life, does not render the individual a sort of automaton, passively obeying the interiorised collective will.’22 How have historians approached this problem?

Contemporary life narrative/oral history interpretive theory consists of three interwoven strands: these may be broadly categorised as the cultural, the social and the psychological. Cultural forms of analysis examine, for example, how individuals draw upon archetypal myths and follow particular genres of storytelling or narrative forms. The concepts central to this approach are derived primarily from anthropology and literary studies. There is now a rich body of literature convincingly demonstrating the pervasiveness of cultural myths and traditional narrative forms in oral expressions of historical consciousness.23 But it is one thing to unpack individual narratives using the tools of cultural analysis; it is another to establish public
cultural scripts within which individual narratives must fit.

An example of the latter approach may be found in Penny Summerfield's post-structural analysis of women's Second World War oral narratives, *Reconstructing Women's Wartime Lives.* In this study, Summerfield explores the way women's oral histories relate to publicly available representations and discourses about women's lives during this period. Each chapter begins with a summary of the relevant public pre-war discourses, such as the daughter/filial relationship. These are gleaned from a variety of sources, for example, official government policies, girl's magazines, and films. The oral histories recorded with women who lived through the war are then located within the matrix of publicly available discourses. The result is reductionist, and complex answers are forced into the categories, for example, of 'stoic' or 'heroic' narratives. Nor is there much room in Summerfield's analysis for the self-reflective individual, rejecting as she does the 'capacity of interviewees to see into the inner processes of [the] self, specifically to perceive internal changes across time and attribute them to identifiable causes'. It is difficult to understand, in the model adopted by Summerfield, why individuals adopt a specific perspective, or how changes in individual perception and understanding could occur. Rather than exploring how and why ideas, values and beliefs are critiqued, reassembled, juxtaposed or rejected, her focus appears to be how far the oral narratives fit pre-existing cultural frameworks.

The social and psychological dimensions of oral history interpretive theory focus upon the context within which remembering takes place, and upon shared psychological imperatives underlying the construction of stories about the past. The theory of 'composure', employed in two key oral history texts published in 1994, Graham Dawson's *Soldier Heroes*, and Alistair Thomson's *Anzac Memories*, incorporates these elements alongside a cultural analysis. Dawson was a member of the Popular Memory Group in Birmingham and Thomson was influenced by the Group's approach, which explored the interaction between public and private memory. The critical insight developed by this Group, according to Michael Roper, is that remembering always invokes broader public discourses, particularly those of the popular media:

> Central to the popular-memory approach is the notion that personal accounts of the past are never produced in isolation from these public narratives, but must operate within their terms. Remembering always entails the working of past experience into available cultural scripts.

The two cultural scripts under investigation in Dawson and Thomson's work are those of the 'soldier hero' of British adventure stories, and the Anzac legend in Australian memory. As Roper pointed out, the main emphasis of both books is upon the link between private and public remembering, and the individual's need to compose a past that is publicly acceptable. Dawson argues that, 'subjective composure fundamentally depends upon social recognition, with its power to confirm that the versions of self and world figured in a narrative correspond to those of other people....' Thomson and Dawson also place considerable emphasis upon the social context, the 'particular publics' such as a wartime platoon, within which memories are recounted and shared. Thomson draws our attention to 'the importance of social acceptance and affirmation' within these groups, which may
be potentially repressive of individual memories or perspectives that do not correspond with those of others.\textsuperscript{12} Dawson describes the ‘determining influence’ of such groups.\textsuperscript{9} These arguments are consistent with those of Halbwachs, emphasizing the controlling role of collectivities sharing a remembered past.

Another dimension of composure is psychological: the need to construct in Thomson’s words ‘a safe and necessary personal coherence out of the unresolved, risky and painful pieces of past and present lives.’ Composing a past we can live with, and that gives us a sense of coherent identity, involves actively managing the memories of traumatic or painful experiences. As Thomson acknowledges, this is not always successful, and ‘we are left with unresolved tension and fragmented, contradictory identities’.\textsuperscript{11} These tensions cause psychic anxieties, and Dawson draws upon Kleinian psychoanalytic theory, and the concept of ‘phantasy’, to explain the purchase of the myth of the soldier hero upon masculine consciousness.\textsuperscript{12}

The theory of composure has had considerable influence among oral historians. It provides a valuable way of understanding the underlying dynamics of life narratives, and provides considerable insights into the cultural, social and psychological dimensions of remembering.

One strength of composure as an interpretive device is that it introduces one possible motivation for story-telling: as a means of actively managing painful experiences from the past.\textsuperscript{10} But, as Roper continues, ‘it has little to say about personal motivations for remembering’. He seeks to address this lacuna in a study of two autobiographical accounts of a specific wartime incident, written by the same author sixty years apart. Roper argues that the author was ‘motivated as much by the need to address feelings which date from the event itself as from the imagined expectations of his audience at the moment of telling’. Roper concludes that unconscious emotions generated in the past coalesce with contemporary ‘life-dilemmas’, triggering the processes of memory. In this analysis individual memories are structured by the unconscious.\textsuperscript{13}

In conclusion, the three strands of contemporary life narrative and oral history interpretive theory – the cultural, social, and psychoanalytic – all lean towards a culturally determinist and functionalist perspective concerning individual memory. Each reinforces the notion that individuals’ memories conform to dominant cultural scripts or unconscious psychic templates, and are recalled within the constraints of ‘particular publics’. It is easy, therefore, for collective memory theorists to reject the significance of individual remembering, and subsume it within the concept of collective memory.

In defending the significance of individual memory and remembering for historians, I would like to raise two questions about the analytical perspectives outlined above. The first relates to the tendency among memory theorists to utilise the same interpretative approaches for both autobiography and oral history; should not the differences between written and oral forms of life narrative be given greater weight? The second asks whether oral historians are prepared to abandon the idea that there is a conscious ‘self’ capable of reflecting upon experience and critiquing public and private discourses or (to use Dawson’s term) ‘cultural imaginaries’.

Roper’s conclusions regarding the processes of memory are based upon two written documents, not oral histories. However, there are differences between the fixed, literary written form of life narrative, and the fluid, interactive and often more ambivalent dialogue that is generated in the oral history interview. All oral narratives are spoken with an audience in mind,
but reminiscing with one's contemporaries (the 'particular publics' of Dawson and Thomson), writing an autobiography, and responding to an oral historian are all very different mnemonic contexts. While the oral history interviewer undoubtedly influences the narrative outcome through engagement with the interviewee, the nature of the dialogue between an interviewer and interviewee is not the same as that within a cohesive social group such as a family, where competing memories jostle for dominance. The interviewer usually does not share the same past, and in many contexts there may be less personal constraint on what may, or may not, be said.

An example of the relative candour within an oral history interview was noted by Alistair Thomson in Anzac Memories, when he wrote of one of his interviewees: '...his remembering was reflective and discursive, and sometimes self-questioning. He decided that he should tell me stories that he preferred not to relate to other audiences or to dwell upon when he was alone...'. Furthermore, a narration that seemingly draws upon a conventional 'cultural script', may be more subversive than is at first apparent. For example, following an oral history interview with an 'ordinary' Italian American 'housewife', Susan Ostrov Weisss concluded that the interviewee almost 'effaced' herself in the initial spontaneous narrative, submerging herself within a conventional family story. But through an insightful analysis of the ways in which the words 'but', and 'just' were used within the narrative, Weisss came to see how her interviewee mediated the gender constraints and expectations of her life:

As the first audience for Mrs. F.'s text, and later one of her reader interpreters, I came to stand before it not with an authority over its interpretation that would foreclose or exhaust its multiple meanings, but with a certain humility, admiration, and, eventually, sympathy. For me the ingenuity (not ingenuousness or disingenuousness) of Mrs. F.'s narrative is the way in which it allows for, but also contains, a multiplicity of positions that are contradictory, yet also permits a certain fluidity of identity within the constraints of her gender, ethnicity, and class."

Oral histories are works in progress, as individuals cognitively and emotionally grapple with the contradictions and complexities of their lives. Raymond Williams, whose writings laid the foundations of modern cultural history, placed great emphasis upon the active nature of consciousness and the dynamic relationship between inherited culture and the individual mind:

The growing society is there, yet it is also made and remade in every individual mind. The making of a mind is, first, the slow learning of shapes, purposes, and meanings, so that work, observation and communication are possible. Then, second, but equal in importance, is the testing of these in experience, the making of new observations, comparisons, and meanings. These are the ordinary processes of human societies and human minds, and we see through them the nature of a culture: that it is always both traditional and creative..."  

Williams describes the making of human consciousness as a creative, active and reflexive process. Thirty years later Luisa Passerini made similar points in her path-breaking article on working-class memories of Fascism. Individual subjectivity, Passerini argued, derived from the interaction between inherited socialisation and the 'capacity for self-reflection' and critique. In his review of collective memory studies, Kansteiner concedes that 'more conventional analyses of the lives and deeds of politicians, artists and intellectuals reveal how individuals have negotiated and tested the limits of... inherited perceptions of the past. Almost by definition these approaches pay tribute to and respect the creative energy of individuals." Do oral historians now believe that the capacity to engage critically and constructively with inherited ideas and values is confined to these elites? If so, the field has indeed made a paradigmatic shift from the concerns and values that led to its growth and development in the 1960s.

INDIVIDUAL REMEMBERING

Are individual memories insignificant, as cultural theorists often suggest, interested as they are in the dominant, public affirmations of memory? Can individual memories challenge dominant narratives, such as those of the nation state for example? In practice, individual and collective memories are often in tension, and the recollections of individuals frequently challenge the construction of partial accounts designed primarily to achieve collective unity. Let us take just one example from oral history to address these issues. In The Battle of Valle Giulia, Alessandro Portelli explored a particularly violent incident during the Second World War, and he compared the memories of Italian anti-Fascist partisans to the dominant public interpretations of these events that emerged in the postwar years. The incident took place as follows. On 10th March 1944 Fascists from Rieti were sent to the small town of Poggio Bustone to find draft resisters for the army, and to arrest political dissenters; a partisan group returned to
in battle, but the rage, the hatred, the desire to kill them that they carried inside them..." These stories reflect the personal struggle to reconcile conflicting values in war and peace. The partisan accounts of the battle of Poggio Bustone also have profound implications for national narratives of the past. In post-war Italy, Portelli reminds us, the Resistance was perceived as the 'foundation of the Italian republican democracy', and patriotic and heroic narratives were 'cleansed' of violence in the partisan struggle. Those who had taken part, however, rejected the official discourse, and:

...tried to make space for violence in their narratives – to justify it as a necessity of the times, sometimes to redeem it as revolutionary value.... they also tried to rescue the memory of the Resistance as class war and civil war from under the suffocating white-wash of the exclusively patriotic war.

Alessandro Portelli concludes that the participants are, 'if we listen and try to understand, more articulate and credible historians that those professional writers and administrators of history who constructed the myth of a domesticated, pacified, almost nonviolent Resistance...."

CONCLUSION
Contemporary oral history interpretive approaches are converging with the theoretical direction of cultural theorists writing on collective memory. That is, the social, discursive and psychological structures of remembering have led both groups of historians to minimise (or even discard) the value of individual memory. I would not wish to deny the valuable insights into the cultural construction of memory and the social context of remembering developed over the past twenty years or more. But surely the interesting issue is not that individuals draw upon contemporary cultural discourses to make sense of their lives, but which ones, and why. Psychoanalytic theories are one way some oral historians have chosen to answer these questions, but as Joanna Bourke points out, 'too often, psychoanalytical explanations for emotional responses emerge out of the model itself.'

Oral historians need to re-assert the value of individual remembering, and the capacity of the conscious self to contest and critique cultural scripts or discourses. Rather than seeking to fit oral narratives to pre-existing cultural representations or psychoanalytic templates, would it not be more fruitful for oral historians to explore those points of conflict and rupture in people's lives that create...
confrontations with discourses of power? As Alessandro Portelli pointed out some time ago, oral history allows us access to the range of 'expressive possibilities' within a given society or time.4 This requires that we remain open to the richness and variety of individual consciousness. We are uniquely placed to investigate ways in which individuals negotiate competing ideas or beliefs, or find spaces within or between dominant discourses. In The Cheese and the Worms, Carlo Ginzberg revealed the imaginative and eccentric worldview of Mennochio, a sixteenth-century Italian miller. The miller of Friuli transformed historians' understanding of the expressive possibilities within sixteenth-century peasant culture.5 What would oral historians make of a contemporary Mennochio?

NOTES
I would like to thank Alistair Thomson for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
2. A discourse is 'a more or less coherent body of statements that can be analyzed using appropriate theories deriving from linguistics, and underlying which is a particular view of the world'. See Ludmilla Jordanova, History in Practice, London: Arnold, 2000, p 212.
14. Karsten, 2002, p 185. It should be noted that Karsten’s references, while reflecting an otherwise admirable breadth of research, contain not one significant contemporary test by an oral historian.
27. Anzac is the acronym for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
32. Dawson, 1994, chapter 2.
44. Portelli, 1997, p 139.